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MERCIFUL DAMAGES:
SOME REMARKS ON FORGIVENESS,
MERCY AND TORT LAW
Neal R. Feigenson*
I want to explore the place, if any, of forgiveness and mercy in
tort law, using empirical psychological research where relevant to
shed some light on the topic. I first describe a number of misgiv-
ings about encouraging forgiveness or mercy as part of the substan-
tive or procedural law of torts. I then suggest a concept, merciful
damages, that may allow some of the benefits of forgiveness and
mercy while avoiding or at least mitigating some of the concerns.
I have benefited greatly from what Jeffrie Murphy and Jean
Hampton have to say about forgiveness and mercy in their book,'
especially Professor Murphy's first and last chapters, and I take
some of his ideas as my points of departure. Murphy carefully dis-
tinguishes forgiveness, which involves a change in feelings toward
the transgressor (specifically, to overcome resentment for the right
reasons), from mercy, which involves an act toward the transgres-
sor (specifically, to relieve the transgressor of some or all of what
would otherwise be his or her just deserts). 2 Moreover, only a vic-
tim of wrongdoing is in a position to forgive the wrongdoer, while
only a decision maker with authority to impose on the wrongdoer
certain legal but harsh consequences is in a position to be
merciful.
Two consequences follow. First, forgiveness is neither necessary
nor sufficient for mercy. Second, "[t]he area of resentment and
forgiveness is individual and personal in a way that legal guilt and
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. I am grateful to Eliza-
beth Malang and the other members of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for organiz-
ing the Symposium and inviting me to participate; to my colleagues Greg Loken and
Linda Meyer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay; and to
Daniel Shuman for sharing with me a prepublication draft of his essay, The Role of
Apology in Tort Law, in 83 JUDICATURE 180 (2000). See infra notes 51-53 and accom-
panying text (describing Shuman's proposal that fact finders be allowed to take a
tortfeasor's apology into account in reducing noneconomic damages and comparison
of that proposal with merciful damages).
1. See JEFFRIE C. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
(1988).
2. See id. at 20-21, 33-34.
3. See id.
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responsibility are not."'4 This is not very promising for an applica-
tion of forgiveness to tort law as a system of substantive and proce-
dural rules. Whether a tort victim, moved by compassion, decides
to forgive the tortfeasor after fully litigating his or her case would
seem not to concern the law (or society at large) directly. Should a
victim be moved to settle with a tortfeasor and thus waive the right
to seek the full compensation to which he or she might be legally
entitled to - that is, to be merciful - would also seem to be with-
out much significance for tort law. In the aggregate, however, such
decisions may affect both the number and sorts of cases that re-
main in the formal adjudicatory system.'
Murphy suggests that mercy, as the "legal analogue" of forgive-
ness,6 may be morally justified within a just legal system. If mercy
on the part of a state decision maker is not simply an unjustified
departure from what the law requires, there must be good reasons
for the decision maker to be merciful. If such reasons exist, how-
ever, it seems that the decision maker has a duty to decide merci-
fully. Mercy becomes a matter of what the person being judged
deserves, and hence mercy is subsumed within justice and is not an
autonomous virtue.7 Murphy's way out of this conundrum is to re-
fer to a private law model in which the victim of the offense has the
right, but not the duty, to forgo imposing on the offender the pen-
alty that justice makes available.8 And if we think of those private
victims as delegating to the appropriate state decision maker their
right to forgo justice, there is no conflict between the state's obliga-
tion to mete out just deserts to criminal offenders and its occasional
exercise of mercy.9
This line of reasoning may help (at least in theory) to explain the
role of mercy in criminal law, but it does not appear to be as useful
when applied to civil litigation. By choosing to sue instead of set-
tle, the victim of a tort implicitly (or explicitly) refuses to waive his
4. Id. at 33.
5. The role of forgiveness in negotiation, mediation and the like is an interesting
topic but it is beyond the scope of this essay. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohen, Apology and
Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1447 (2000) (discussing research on the potential benefits of apology in avoiding liti-
gation); see also Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1165 (1997).
6. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 34.
7. The argument is more complicated than this; for instance, mercy can be sup-
ported on consequentialist grounds, but in that case, justice is overridden by utility as
a ground for decision. See id. at 172-73.
8. See id. at 175-76.
9. See id. at 177-80.
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or her right to obtain full compensation from the tortfeasor. It
seems odd, then, to posit that the state has been delegated any
waiver such that the state's exercise of mercy in civil adjudication
may be consistent with justice.
Compassion, Mercy and Legal Judgment10
Let us assume, nevertheless, that state decision makers (judges
and/or juries) in tort cases may, consistently with justice, decide
mercifully. Let us also assume that, although forgiveness is neither
necessary nor sufficient for mercy, the (private) feeling that drives
forgiveness - compassion or sympathy" (and love) - may moti-
vate the (public) act, and therefore, that the feeling may have some
significance for law. 2
Is compassionate or sympathetic decision making a good thing?
Theoretical arguments that it is are (mostly) familiar. It has been
said that "the ultimate function of sympathy is to provide[ ] a vital
sense of commonality or connection among individuals, dis-
rupt[ing] ... the trend toward what will eventually be isolation and
death.' 3 Philosophers, similarly, have long characterized sympa-
thy as one of the "moral sentiments," crucial to the maintenance of
peaceful co-existence in society.14 Compassion contributes to
moral judgment because it promotes a concern for the welfare of
others that is fundamental to many moral systems. It can be ar-
gued that sympathetic decision making may lead to more demo-
cratic and just results insofar as it helps correct for the law's
relative lack of attention to those traditionally disadvantaged in so-
ciety, thus tending to "level the playing field" of justice. 15 Finally,
the process of compassionate decision making is democratically in-
clusive because it incorporates into formal legal decision making,
10. The arguments and discussions of supporting research in this section are
adapted from a previously published article. See Neal Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal
Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997).
11. A basic definition of compassion or sympathy (I treat the two terms as synony-
mous) is a heightened awareness of the suffering of another and the urge to alleviate
that suffering. Compassion, like most if not all emotions, thus combines cognitive,
affective and action-oriented features: the awareness of the other's suffering is both
thought and felt and is accompanied by the desire to do something about it. Sympa-
thy or compassion involves the ability to imagine oneself in the sufferer's predicament
and, in some sense, to feel the other's suffering.
12. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 34, 176.
13. Feigenson, supra note 10, at 27 (quoting LAUREN WUPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SYMPATHY 68, 177 (1991)).
14. See id.
15. Id.
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with its traditionally male model of objective rationality, empathic
modes of moral reasoning associated with women.
What does empirical psychology, and in particular the psychol-
ogy of the emotions, have to say about the relationship between
compassion or sympathy and legal decision making? Three bene-
fits have been identified. Compassion in legal judgment may be
desirable because it enables decision makers to better understand
the situations they judge; "by taking the perspectives of all parties
involved, judges better appreciate the human meanings of those
situations.' 1 6 Moreover, compassion is a natural part of human life
whose absence or repression would impair decision making. Re-
search on the effects of mood on judgment suggests that compas-
sion may enhance legal decision making by leading to more careful
and deliberate information processing.
The research also tells us, however, that compassion is likely to
lead to decisions that are unduly subjective and biased, contrary to
many norms of good decision making. 17 Because compassion in-
volves taking the perspective of the other person, the target of the
compassion, compassionate decisions are likely to be highly subjec-
tive (in a sense that cannot be ascribed to other emotional judg-
ments). In one study, for instance, participants who were
instructed to take the perspective of a target person attributed to
the target a greater number of characteristics they believed to be
true of themselves than did participants not instructed to take the
perspective of the target.' 8 Moreover, the researchers found no
significant difference between the responses of participants in-
structed to imagine what they would think and feel if they were in
the target person's situation and those instructed to imagine what
the target person was thinking and feeling. This further indicated
that decision makers instructed to empathize have a hard time dis-
tinguishing self from other.' 9 The consequence is that decision
makers may confusedly decide the case before them on the basis of
information about themselves instead of the parties.2 0 In a legal
system in which similar cases may be presented to any of several
decision makers (different juries, different judges in same district),
this subjectivity promises to decrease consistency (or interdecision-
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 33-34.
19. See id. at 33.
20. This sense of subjectivity in judgment is, in part, what the rule against "Golden
Rule" arguments is designed to avoid. See id. at 14-15.
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maker reliability, to use the technical term), undermining the basic
justice goal of treating like cases alike.
Compassion is also likely to bias legal decision making. For one
thing, sympathetic or compassionate decision making is prone to
diverge from the widely accepted ideal of impartial justice.2 1 Re-
search confirms this conflict between sympathy and impartial jus-
tice.22 Participants in two experiments were faced with either the
task of allocating relatively desirable or undesirable work assign-
ments to employees or with the task of allocating scarce resources
among deserving candidates. 23 In the first experiment, (proce-
dural) justice dictated allocating the jobs by a random procedure;
in the second, (distributive) justice dictated allocation according to
need.24
In each experiment, participants who were instructed to imagine
how the employee or potential recipient felt about the situation
were more likely to allocate the better job or the scarce resource to
the target person than justice principles required - and the partici-
pants themselves acknowledged that their choices were less fair.
Additional unfair bias results both from the ways compassion is
aroused (i.e., the psychological "inputs" that influence the intensity
of sympathy) and from how compassion affects social judgments
(the psychological "outputs" resulting from the influence of sympa-
thy).2 6 Consider compassion's inputs. A basic function of all emo-
tions is to redirect the attention of the person experiencing the
emotion. This function seems perfectly consistent with one major
benefit of sympathy in legal judgment: it calls our attention to fea-
tures of the case that are worth noticing and valuing. The redirec-
tion of attention and emphasis by emotion works well when the
intensity of the feeling matches the urgency of the situation. Re-
search shows, for instance, that levels of sympathy for an accident
victim (and, hence, the urge to relieve the victim's suffering) do
correspond, to some extent, to the severity of the victim's suffer-
ing.27 But the intensity of a judge's or juror's emotional response
to a case may not match its legal urgency. The ways in which sym-
pathy is generated suggest that compassionate decision making is
likely to be unfairly biased because the factors that cause sympathy
21. See Feigenson, supra note 10, at 49.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 49.
25. See id. at 49-50.
26. See id. at 50.
27. See id.
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do not correspond or are even irrelevant to the factors on which
just decisions should be based. Any of three factors affecting the
intensity of sympathy may be involved.
First, sympathy is subject to a salience bias. "Empathy and sym-
pathy depend most on the sights and sounds of the person in
pain."28 An empathy-based morality, as psychologist Martin Hoff-
man has argued, is therefore too prone to be biased by the salience
and source of the stimulus.29 "A cry of pain may arouse more em-
pathic distress than a facial grimace; a friend's or relative's cry
more than a stranger's "3.... ,0 In general, the more salient the
stimulus, the stronger the affective reaction. Yet the salience of a
party's suffering at trial may be affected as much by the lawyers'
talents in eliciting and evoking that suffering as by its true extent,
in which case the intensity of emotional response would not relia-
bly signal the appropriateness of that response.
Research also shows that compassion is more readily aroused the
greater the similarity between observer and sufferer. The more
similar to the sufferer the observer believes herself to be, the more
readily and fully she can imagine what the sufferer's world looks
and feels like. Relatedly, the intensity of sympathy may be influ-
enced by how much the perceiver likes the sufferer. But no accept-
able legal or moral theory makes the similarity of the decision
maker to the litigant or the likeability of the litigant relevant to the
substantive justice of the outcome.
Compassion, like other emotional reactions, also tends to be
more intense the more unexpected the event giving rise to the emo-
tion. Research shows that observers tend to feel greater sympathy
for the victim of an accident (or a crime) that occurs under excep-
tional circumstances. But the unexpectedness or perceived abnor-
mality of an instance of suffering is not at all an accurate heuristic
for whether a legal decision maker should mercifully seek to allevi-
ate that suffering. Legal scholar Richard Delgado has eloquently
explained how sympathy is liable, for exactly this reason, to ignore
the most pervasive suffering: the more entrenched the poor be-
come in their poverty, the more others become accustomed to the
presence of the extremely poor, and the less sympathetic they are
likely to be.3'
28. Feigenson, supra note 10, at 50.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 55.
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Finally, consider compassion's outputs. Research on affect and
social judgment also indicates that compassion may lead decision
makers to perceive and weigh the evidence in a biased fashion.32
This research shows generally that emotional feelings influence
which facts decision makers will attend to, how much time they will
spend poring over them, and how they will interpret and categorize
them.33 Decision makers' feelings in response to what they first
learn about the case will affect their further perception and evalua-
tion of the case, because they learn the evidence over a period of
time and cannot withhold their judgments until all the evidence is
in. And in the case of compassion or sympathy, the perspective-
taking slants the observer's judgment in favor of the target of the
emotion.34
These biases in compassionate legal judgment would not alone
make compassion in tort law suspect, if the biases were those we
would accept on moral grounds. Unfortunately, they are not. Fa-
voritism based on the relative salience of the target person's suffer-
ing, the similarity of target to observer, the likeability of the target
and the unexpectedness of the suffering bear no necessary connec-
tion to any coherent conception of fair decision making. The bi-
ases that compassion introduces to factual perception and
interpretation only compound the problem. So to the extent that
compassion motivates forgiveness and hence mercy, merciful tort
decisions run a considerable risk of being biased and unfair./
Professor Murphy observes that mercy poses what he calls equal
protection problems. If there is a good reason to be merciful to
A, then it must be (partly) because of some characteristic that A
possesses. All things being equal, if B shares that characteristic,
doesn't B, then, deserve equivalent mercy? But "deserve mercy" is
an oxymoron. And if the giving of mercy remains optional, so that
there is no paradox in not requiring mercy for B while continuing
to recognize the characteristic as a good reason for mercy, the une-
qual treatment of A and B persists. If this is a bothersome feature
32. See id. at 57-59.
33. See id.
34. I noted earlier that this perspective-taking makes judgment more subjective
because it leads the observer to ascribe more of his or her own features to the target
of observation. Relevant here is that this subjectivizing takes a particular direction:
participants tend to attribute to the target person positive traits they attribute to
themselves rather than neutral or negative ones. Thus, compassionate decision mak-
ers (unsurprisingly) tend to view the evidence favorably to the object of their
compassion.
35. See HAMPTON & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 180-81.
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with regard to the good reasons for being merciful, then it should
trouble us all the more when unequal treatment results from less
defensible features of compassion and mercy.
Merciful Damages
Despite these misgivings, perhaps compassionate mercy could
have a place in tort law, one that recognizes at least some of the
virtues of forgiveness without being vitiated by (all of) the forego-
ing concerns. Consider that tort law (albeit to the chagrin of some)
accommodates retributive emotions when it allows punitive dam-
ages to be assessed against defendants whose conduct is deter-
mined to be especially egregious or outrageous. Perhaps the law
should also make room for forgiveness and mercy by allowing what
I will call merciful damages. Merciful damages would reduce the
extent of a culpable tort defendant's liability when the decision
maker (properly) decides to be merciful toward the defendant.
They would be determined in a separate damages phase of a bifur-
cated civil proceeding, after the liability decision. In the remainder
of this essay I will briefly outline the when, how and why of
merciful damages.
When. To determine when merciful damages would be war-
ranted, let us turn to Professor Murphy's analysis of (private) for-
giveness. Murphy argues that a victim ought to forgive wrongdoing
in any number of situations in which it is possible to distinguish the
immoral act from the immoral agent and thus to square forgiveness
with self-respect and respect for the law.36 Where the wrongdoer
has separated himself from his act, we can "join the wrongdoer in
condemning the very act from which he now stands emotionally
separated '37 without continuing to resent the person who commit-
ted the act. Forgiveness is morally appropriate where the wrong-
doer (1) has repented or had a change of heart; (2) meant well or
had good motives; (3) has suffered enough (for morally cognizable
reasons); or (4) has undergone humiliation (for instance, through
an apology ritual); and it is also appropriate (5) for old times' sake,
out of recognition of the wrongdoer's personhood before the
offense.38
Will any of these situations justify merciful decision making in
the legal sphere? Some may. Repentance, sufficient suffering or
36. See id. at 24-25.
37. Id. at 25.
38. See id. at 24. I do not address Murphy's argument that forgiveness may also
sometimes be morally required. See id. at 29-32.
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sincere apology by the tort defendant would seem to warrant a
merciful response by a public decision maker just as they would
support forgiveness by the private victim. Meaning well or having
good motives could properly evoke mercy toward the would-be
Good Samaritan whose carelessness leaves the victim worse off.3
9
But there are difficulties. As a practical matter, many defendants
who repent or apologize between tort and trial would presumably
manifest that change of heart by settling the lawsuit, so there
would not be much occasion for judge or jury to exercise mercy on
those grounds.4" Nor would forgiving for old times' sake find much
purchase in many tort suits because of the lack of any prior (and
potentially continuing) relationship between plaintiff and
defendant.
Another ground for being merciful, however, may be peculiarly
applicable to certain tort cases, and allows the tort decision maker
to implement the same principle that Murphy's criteria share: war-
ranting forgiveness by separating the sinner from the sin.4 It
should also tend to avoid the undesirable bias introduced by the
personal emotional feelings that often drive forgiveness.42 When
jurors determine responsibility for harm, they tend to think
(among other things) that bad outcomes must be due to bad peo-
ple, and that the worse the outcome, the worse the cause.43 The
first is an extension of what psychologists call the correspondence
bias or the fundamental attribution error: people act the way they
do primarily because of the kinds of people they are rather than
the kinds of situations in which they find themselves." The second
is an instance of what is known as thinking by representativeness:
the sample resembles the universe from which it is drawn, the
cause resembles the consequence it engenders. 45 The net effect of
39. Experimental research shows that mock jurors take the actor's good motives
into account in making punishment decisions in euthanasia cases when they interpret
jury instructions as allowing them to do so. See Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury
Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 25 (1985).
40. That some apologizing defendants will not settle is presumed by Shuman's
proposal that factfinders be permitted to reduce a tort plaintiff's noneconomic dam-
ages in recognition of the defendant's apology. See Daniel Shuman, The Role of
Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180 (2000).
41. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1.
42. This ground is not necessary for an award of merciful damages; I am not sure
whether it should alone be sufficient for them.
43. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK
ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000).
44. See id.
45. See id.
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these habits of thought is to conflate actor with outcome, sinner
with sin.46
Sometimes this kind of thinking is especially inapt.47 Sometimes
the harm a defendant has caused the plaintiff is far out of propor-
tion to the riskiness of his or her conduct, to the blameworthiness
of the conduct ex ante. Indeed, many accidents are caused by mere
inadvertence or impulse rather than intentional or even reckless
disregard of the safety of others. The consequences of inattention,
however, can be enormous: death or severe injury. In such cases it
seems especially incorrect (albeit particularly tempting48) to iden-
tify bad outcomes with bad character. It is not so much that the
tortfeasor has distanced himself or herself from his or her violation
of the norm of reasonable care (for instance, by confession and
apology) as that the circumstances show no great disrespect for the
norm in the first place. Now as long as the defendant's conduct
was sufficiently risky to reach the threshold of being considered
negligent, the law entitles - commands - the decision maker to
hold the defendant liable for the full extent of the injuries thus
caused. When full liability is dictated by rule yet grossly dispropor-
tionate to just deserts, mercy would allow the decision maker to
temper justice and decline to assess the (marginally blameworthy)
actor with all of the (overwhelmingly negative) consequences of
the act.
Thus, in awarding merciful damages, the decision maker in effect
says to this sort of defendant: We recognize that you did wrong
(acted negligently) and caused harm to the plaintiff. The magni-
tude of the harm, however, is so much greater than that the con-
duct probably risked that to say "the harm belongs to you" would
impose unjustified suffering on you - no less unjustified (insofar
as actual harm exceeds probable harm) than it would be to permit
the plaintiff to bear that harm. Compassion is the appropriate re-
46. For a detailed discussion of these and other habits of common sense legal deci-
sion-making, see FEIGENSON, supra note 43.
47. See Shuman, supra note 40.
48. When jurors are confronted with the task of assigning liability that seems dis-
proportionate to blameworthiness, they may be prone to restore proportionality, a
hallmark of common sense justice, by resorting to blaming habits that convert mere
inadvertence into (greater) culpability. Thus the cause will seem to resemble the ef-
fect, and the punishment will seem to match the offense. Melodramatic thinking, in
which bad outcomes like accidents are traced to the bad conduct of bad guys, is the
jury's way of doing this. (And mercy tempers the consequences of juries' tendency to
use melodramatic thinking to magnify the egregiousness of a tort defendant's
conduct.)
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sponse to the perception of unjustified suffering, and compassion
motivates mercy. 9
Think of merciful damages on this ground as a way to fine-tune
Holmes's insight that liability attaches to the moral quality of
(risky) action and not to action per se.50 One who inadvertently
causes serious harm or injures through conduct that falls slightly
short of the community's expectations has indeed behaved in a
blameworthy fashion - but not in a very blameworthy fashion.
Harm in excess of culpability is just bad luck, not truly indicative of
the blameworthiness of the actor as a person. Damages, however,
must be paid by people, not their acts; in a third-party liability re-
gime there is no practical way to disentangle the two even if moral-
ity suggests they should be distinguished. Merciful damages would
allow decision makers to recognize the difference between the na-
ture of the act and the nature of the actor when the difference is
plain.
The idea of merciful damages is not entirely unanticipated in the
law. In his recent article, Daniel Shuman points out that many
states permit the fact finder to consider the defendant's public
apology in mitigation of damages for defamation.-1 Shuman him-
self recommends extending this concept to allow the fact finder to
reduce the plaintiff's intangible or noneconomic losses by recogniz-
ing the defendant's apology in any kind of case.52 Merciful dam-
ages goes still further by permitting a reduction in the defendant's
liability whenever mercy is warranted. 3
49. This kind of case should be distinguished from those in which tort law entirely
relieves the defendant of responsibility on the ground that the (extensive) damages
were unforeseeable. Forgiveness and mercy do not negate responsibility but rather
(some of) what would otherwise be its consequences. Cf. Joanna North, The "Ideal"
of Forgiveness: A Philosopher's Exploration, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS 15, 17-18
(Robert D. Enright & Joanna North, eds., 1998). Consider, for instance, Petition of
Kinsman Transit Company, 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). To simplify the facts, a ship-
owner negligently secured one of its boats to a dock, so that it was knocked loose by
floating ice and crashed into a drawbridge that the city had negligently failed to raise.
Ship and bridge dammed the flow of ice, causing widespread flooding. The court held
both shipowner and city liable, rejecting their argument that their carelessness could
not be considered the proximate cause of such vast damages and reasoning that the
harm they caused was exactly the sort that should have been anticipated given their
negligence, only greater. Had the defendant's carelessness been less pronounced (and
perhaps also had the defendants met one or more of Murphy's five criteria), this could
have been a proper case for liability followed by mercy.
50. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 76-77 (1881/1963).
51. See Shuman, supra note 40.
52. See id.
53. Shuman's recommendation resembles the merciful damages proposed in this
paper in that it would apply to any kind of tort case, and would be decided by the fact
2000] 1643
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How. A few comments on the administration of merciful dam-
ages are in order. Relegating the merciful decision to a later,
"damages phase" of trial, as I suggested earlier, promises some ad-
vantages. First, exercising mercy with regard to damages instead of
liability would be more consistent with Murphy's conception of for-
giveness as distinct from excuse, justification, or any other mitiga-
tion of responsibility. Forgiveness (and resentment) pertain to
wrongdoing that is neither excused nor justified; one who forgives
recognizes the wrongdoer's responsibility but then treats the
wrongdoer less harshly than he or she has a right to do." In the
proposed scheme, the defendant's responsibility would first be de-
cided in a liability phase of trial. Only the legally responsible de-
fendant is subject to damages, and only such a defendant, whose
responsibility has been recognized, could benefit, in a second phase
of trial, from a merciful reduction in damages.55
Second, while the objections to the use of compassion in legal
decision making discussed earlier would still apply to the decision
whether to award mercifuls, at least some would apply with less
force. Because forgiveness and mercy address the tortfeasor and
not the tort, the sinner and not the sin,56 more legally irrelevant
information about the defendant would come before the decision
maker, and the subjectivity and bias inherent in compassionate
judging would continue to be a risk. If damages are determined
after liability, however, compassion would not skew the basic liabil-
ity judgment. Compassion would be no more likely to exonerate
the defendant than it is now. The risk of unequal treatment of sim-
ilarly situated defendants would remain, but would at least be con-
fined to the damage award. In short, just as information not
relevant to a capital defendant's guilt or innocence may be admit-
ted into evidence in the penalty phase so that the decision makers
may reach a morally superior sentence, so a damages phase in
finder on a case-by-case basis. Merciful damages differ from Shuman's proposal,
however, in a couple of important respects. First, as noted in the text, merciful dam-
ages may be warranted for reasons other than the defendant's apology. Second, an
award of mercifuls would not reduce the plaintiff's recovery. See supra notes 49-52
and accompanying text.
54. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 20.
55. Merciful damages are thus distinguished from the sense in which the general
tort rule of negligence can itself be described as "forgiving" (by comparison with strict
liability), because the application of the more lenient negligence rule (where it makes
a difference) results in a decision of no liability in the first place - which is not what
Murphy and others mean by forgiveness. See supra note 49 (contrasting merciful
damages with proximate cause limitations on legal responsibility).
56. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 24-25.
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which mercifuls are possible would admit otherwise extraneous
party information in order that the court decide on a morally supe-
rior award.57
An obvious objection to this proposal, even conceding that the
defendant who (carelessly) causes harm far out of proportion to his
blameworthiness may be a proper target of compassion, is the tort
law precept that "where one of two innocent persons must suffer a
loss, it should be borne by the one who occasioned it."58 Merciful
damages would hardly be morally appropriate if they resulted in
undercompensating a blameless and deserving victim - especially
given experimental59 and jury verdict6° research showing that tort
jurors may already be prone to anti-plaintiff bias in awarding com-
pensatory damages. To address this concern, the state could estab-
lish a fund from punitive damages paid to the state instead of
directly to the plaintiff (as some states already mandate 61) and use
that fund to make up shortfalls from full compensation created by
mercifuls. These shortfalls are almost certain to be smaller on av-
erage than the funds generated by the average punitive award, be-
cause punitives can range up to many times compensatory
damages, whereas mercifuls cannot exceed compensatory damages.
Moreover, assuming that mercifuls are confined to unusual cases,
such as those in which harm appears greatly to exceed culpability,
they should be awarded only exceptionally - perhaps something
57. This would not entirely avoid evidentiary problems. Federal Rule of Evidence
408, for instance, makes evidence of a defendant's apology inadmissible if made dur-
ing compromise negotiations, and some states make a defendant's "benevolent ges-
tures" inadmissible. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (1999). As Shuman
points out, there is at least a tension between the therapeutic value of apology for the
victim, which is generally highest when the apology is prompt, and the evidentiary
rules that protect only those apologies madb during settlement talks. See Shuman,
supra note 40.
58. Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927).
59. Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on At-
tributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 597 (1997); Doug Zickafoose & Brian Bornstein, Double Dis-
counting: The Effects of Comparative Negligence on Mock Juror Decision Making, 23
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 577 (1999).
60. See James Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEG. STUD.
751, 752 (1985).
61. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1999). See generally Sonia
Larsen, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Requiring that
Percentage of Punitive Damage Awards be Paid Directly to State or Court-Adminis-
tered Fund, 16 A.L.R. FED. 129 (1993).
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in the range of the 5% or so of cases in which punitives are now
awarded,62 so that the fund should not readily be exhausted.63
Why. Let me conclude by suggesting why merciful damages, if
the idea can survive the criticisms raised earlier, might be a good
thing. There is, first of all, a pleasing moral symmetry in permitting
tort decision makers to judge mercifully. Just as punitive damages
empower decision makers to give vent to anger and outrage at ma-
licious conduct that results in relatively minor damage, so merciful
damages would empower them to relieve defendants who have
merely been careless of some of the overwhelming consequences of
their behavior - behavior in which any of us could easily imagine
ourselves engaging.
Forgiveness and mercy may also be therapeutic for the
tortfeasor. Without mercy inspired by forgiveness, the likelihood is
greater that an individual defendant will return again and again,
even obsessively, to the memory of the transgression, which will
continue to define his current existence as the linchpin of his self-
narrative.64 Forgiveness and mercy exercise a kind of social influ-
ence on the tortfeasor, through which society tells him or her, "You
62. See generally Michael Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data
and Further Inquiry, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 15.
63. Jury research suggests another reason why being merciful to tortfeasors in the
way my proposal permits may be unjust to their victims. Experiments varying trial
format show that plaintiffs win less often in bifurcated trials than they do in unitary
trials (although when they win, they receive larger awards). See Irwin Horowitz &
Kenneth Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex
Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1990). This may very well be because the
sympathy for victims evoked by proof of damages sometimes inclines jurors in unitary
trials to decide for the victims on the question of liability. Yet it would hardly seem
fair to make room for leniency toward injurers at the expense of depriving some
(otherwise deserving) victims of any recovery at all.
It could be argued, on the other hand, that juries, recognizing the availability of
mercifuls, could inflate their compensatbry damages awards, confident that the incre-
ment would be assessed to the fund, not to the defendant. Appropriate jury instruc-
tions permitting mercifuls only in exceptional cases could address this concern.
Another, procedural objection to the proposal is that every case would have to be
bifurcated, because it most likely could not be determined in advance which cases
would be strong enough candidates for a possible award of mercifuls. Currently only
unusually complex cases tend not to be tried in unitary proceedings. This would
somewhat simplify trials in which defendants are ultimately found not liable (by elimi-
nating proof of damages), but would lengthen proceedings in the slight majority of
cases in which defendants are found liable. Note that Shuman also recommends bi-
furcated proceedings. See Shuman, supra note 40.
64. See JEFFERSON A. SINGER & PETER SALOVEY, THE REMEMBERED SELF 42
(1993); cf. E.D. Scobie & G.E.W. Scobie, Damaging Events: The Perceived Need for
Forgiveness, 28 J. THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 373, 395 (1998).
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are not that act of negligence. It's okay to tell a new story about
yourself. 65
The value of merciful damages for the tort victim is another mat-
ter. Forgiveness, which as we have seen may inspire mercy, has
often been proclaimed as therapeutic for the victim because it
reduces the anxiety and stress associated with continuing anger and
resentment.66 (It may be observed that these positive health effects
of forgiveness are based largely on anecdotal experience and
clinical observation, and some researchers have pointed to a lack of
quantitative empirical support for such claims.67) Perhaps more
importantly from the victim's perspective, mercy may be valuable
because, as Professor Murphy writes of forgiveness, it reflects
moral humility, the victim's recognition that he or she, too, could
offend and desire forgiveness, and would want to live in a world in
which that forgiveness would be forthcoming.68 Murphy also lauds
the victim who, acting out of (appropriate) compassion, mercifully
waives his or her right to enforce a legal obligation, because the
"disposition to mercy" helps to reign in the "narrow and self-in-
volved tendenc[y]" always to stand on our rights.69
But how can these benefits accrue to the tort victim when it is
the legal decision maker who may award mercifuls? Indeed, what
can be good about an act of mercy by the community toward a
tortfeasor to whom the victim himself or herself, by proceeding to
trial, has chosen not to be merciful? It is this: the public exercise
of forgiveness and mercy is more impressive and more meaningful
than the merely private. Only through lawful, public acts can the
65. Cf HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 237 (1958).
Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have
done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed
from which we would never recover; we would remain the victims of its con-
sequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the magic
formula to break the spell.
Id. Later Arendt expands the point:
[F]orgiveness may be the necessary corrective for the inevitable damages
resulting from action .... [T]respassing [as opposed to 'crime and willed
evil'] is an everyday occurrence which is in the very nature of action's con-
stant establishment of new relationships within a web of relations, and it
needs forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by
constantly releasing men from what they have done unknowingly.
Id. at 239-40.
66. See, e.g., Richard Fitzgibbons, Anger and the Healing Power of Forgiveness: A
Psychiatrist's View, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS 63 (Robert D. Enright & Joanna
North, eds., 1998).
67. Scobie & Scobie, supra note 64, at 376.
68. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 1, at 32.
69. Id. at 176.
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community affirm that as a community it displays the virtues of
moral humility and not always standing on its rights. And because
it acts through a public, lawful process, the community can be more
confident that its mercy is morally appropriate, because it is not
due to the victim's insufficient self-respect or insufficient respect
for the rule or norm the defendant has violated. If we may pre-
sume that the tort victim who forgoes mercy by not settling (even
after receiving the defendant's apology and, let us say, reasonable
settlement offer) cedes to the community (represented by judge
and jury) the right to determine satisfactory compensation, then
the community may properly grant mercy even where the victim
has not, thereby expressing its contrary view that mercy is war-
ranted. It may even be that the victim will be led by the commu-
nity's merciful example to become more forgiving (and thus to
obtain the benefits that supposedly accrue therefrom).7"
Finally, merciful decision making may be valuable because it ad-
dresses not just the tortfeasor, the victim, and the relationship be-
tween them, but also the relationship of both tortfeasor and victim
to the community.7 Forgiveness and mercy help to reintegrate the
defendant into the community, reducing the debilitating social con-
sequences of disconnectedness.72 A priest and former police chief
writes that the best way for a police department to respond to a big
public mistake (e.g., the beating of Rodney King) may be to apolo-
gize and seek forgiveness, 73 and that forgiveness promises to bene-
fit both the police and the public by alleviating their mutual sense
of alienation and antagonism. It is not inconceivable that an analo-
gous reduction in the alienation pervasive in consumerist society
would ensue if corporate defendants were given an incentive to
elicit forgiveness and mercy instead of treating victims of their
70. Another divergence between the community's exercise of mercy and the tort
victim's is that a jury might more readily be merciful with someone else's money.
Making up merciful reductions in the victim's damages out of state funds, as proposed
earlier, only partly responds to this objection, because even though the plaintiff will
not be undercompensated as long as the compensation fund is solvent, jurors may still
be too merciful too often for the solvency of the fund.
71. See Walter J. Dickey, Forgiveness and Crime: The Possibilities of Restorative
Justice, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS 106, 107 (Robert D. Enright & Joanna North,
eds., 1998).
72. For a thorough discussion of restorative justice based on apology and repara-
tions by the criminal offender, emphasizing the value of reintegration into the com-
munity, see Gordon Bazemore, Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption:
Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 768 (1998).
73. See David Couper, Forgiveness in the Community: Views from an Episcopal
Priest and Former Chief of Police, in EXPLORING FORGIVENESS 121, 126-27 (Robert
D. Enright & Joanna North, eds., 1998).
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products as quantifiable variables in calculations of expected acci-
dent costs. 74 Note also that giving defendants an incentive to apol-
ogize could also increase the number of settlements and reduce the
number and cost of antagonistic, divisive lawsuits.75 And the in-
centive seems real: what little empirical research there is indicates
that confessing one's blameworthy actions does indeed reduce ob-
servers' anger toward the actor and increases their inclination to
forgive.76 So tort defendants would have reason to believe that
contrition may pay off in the form of the enhanced prospect of
mercifuls, as well as a better relationship with the community.
CONCLUSION
Six centuries ago, the lawyer for a man whose servant properly
set a fire but then carelessly tended it, so that it spread to the plain-
tiff's house and burned it, argued that his client "will be undone
and impoverished all his days if this action is maintained against
him; for then twenty other such suits will be brought against him
for the same matter. ' 77 The judge responded: "What is that to us?
74. It may be relevant to note that, judging by the size of punitive damage awards,
jurors seem to get angriest at corporate defendants who they believe to have
subordinated consumer safety to cost-benefit calculations. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gen-
eral Motors, No. BC 116-926 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 9, 1999), in which a jury awarded
burn victims of exploding gas tanks $107 million in compensatory damages and over
$4.8 billion in punitive damages. (The trial judge later remitted the award to approxi-
mately $1 billion, and the defendants are appealing the decision. See 43 JURY VER-
DICT WEEKLY 39 (Ca.).
75. See Cohen, supra note 5.
76. Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 281 (1991). In another experiment, a little boy who transgressed
(by helping a confederate trip a little girl) was perceived to be less aggressive and less
deserving of punishment when he expressed remorse after the incident than when he
expressed pleasure in what he had done. See Gary S. Schwartz et al., The Effects of
Post- Transgression Remorse on Perceived Aggression, Attributions of Intent, and Level
of Punishment, 17 BRIT. J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 293 (1978). In addition, two
studies show that children blame and punish transgressors less when the actor apolo-
gizes. See Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies,
43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742 (1982); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R.
Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of the Actor's Apology,
Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 353 (1989). Research on victims'
responses also indicates that the offenders' apologies improve victims' impressions of
the offenders and reduce victims' tendency to be aggressive toward the offenders. See
Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating Ap-
praisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (1989).
However, as Shuman emphasizes, these effects have not been shown for serious
harms, so the incentives in at least some instances warranting merciful damages (those
in which harm greatly exceeds culpability) are in question. See Shuman, supra note
40.
77. Beaulieu v. Finglam, Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, f. 18, pl. 6 (1401).
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It is better that he should be utterly undone than that the law be
changed for him"'78 Who today is not taken aback (at the very
least) by this response? If it would be an improvement in the mo-
rality of our tort law to allow for exceptional acts of mercy, then
perhaps merciful damages would be a good way to do it.
78. Id.
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